

QUT Digital Repository:
<http://eprints.qut.edu.au/>



This is the author version published as:

Gagnon, Jean-Paul (2010) *Political theory and theoretical physics*. [Working Paper]

Copyright 2010 Jean-Paul Gagnon

Title: Political Theory and Theoretical Physics

Abstract:

This paper explains, somewhat along a Simmelian line, that political theory may produce practical and universal theories like those developed in theoretical physics. The reasoning behind this paper is to show that the Element of Democracy Theory may be true by way of comparing it to Einstein's Special Relativity – specifically concerning the parameters of symmetry, unification, simplicity, and utility. These parameters are what make a theory in physics as meeting them not only fits with current knowledge, but also produces paths towards testing (application). As the Element of Democracy Theory meets these same parameters, it could settle the debate concerning the definition of democracy. This will be shown firstly by discussing why no one has yet achieved a universal definition of democracy; secondly by explaining the parameters chosen (as in why these and not others confirm or scuttle theories); and thirdly by comparing how Special Relativity and the Element of Democracy match the parameters.

Keywords: Social Science, Political Theory, Physics, Democracy, Einstein

Introduction

This paper shows that the Element of Democracy Theory may be true by way of comparing it to Einstein's Theory of Special Relativity. This comparison is necessary as political theory can be argued to be hindered at times by ideology and positivism – something Miller (1987:385) argued – which can negatively affect the chances the Element of Democracy Theory has to ending the democracy debate. A stable definition of democracy, as is widely known, has been sought for some time. Lijphart (1999, 1994), Dahl (1985, 1989, 1997), Sartori (1987, 1973), Barber (2003, 2003a, 1984), Oakeshott (Franco, 1990), Rawls (Pogge, 2007), Dworkin (2008), Habermas (McCarthy, 1984; Holub, 1991; White, 1995), and many others have been attempting this but have been unsuccessful because they were defining styles of democracy – not democracy itself as an objective theory supported by anthropological and archaeological evidence. Had they been successful, there would currently be a universally accepted definition of democracy other than notions of 'the power of the people' and incorrect references to democracy having its birthplace in ancient Athens or that the 'USA equals democracy' or that democracy was invented by the 'West' (which it was not).

At this juncture the Element of Democracy Theory and a stable universal definition of democracy are co-dependent. The theory is necessary to explain how the definition was created and as such provides a theoretical foundation for the definition of democracy. And the definition of democracy in turn validates the theory when the term is used or when the concept is discussed as the theory gains practical validation through political analysis. Despite this, a critical issue to address is the "so what" question. Should the theory and definition be accepted by the reader, are they too general, and if so, what use to they then have? Firstly, general can be conceptualised in a way that connotes a lack of

utility which is not the case for the work herein. The theory and definition are universal rather than general and fill a large gap in democratic theory. In the Element of Democracy Theory, a genealogy of democracy is argued to be over 46,000 years old with democracy being practiced by early Mesolithic humans; the universality of democracy is shown at every level of governance despite country or culture; the fact that democracy is, and has been present, in all polities due to its organic qualities (meaning it cannot be destroyed, only suppressed); the falsity behind current democratic practice and theory stating the need for certain institutions to be present in a country or polity for democracy to happen; and ultimately that democracy's parameters need to be defined by the population they are being observed in which allows culturally relevant institutions to emerge and produce a distinct style of democracy.

The definition, on the other hand, permits the analysis of democracy to happen in objective space. It states that democracy is non-other than the pluralist citizenry expressing its sovereignty through their own implicit understandings of equality, communication, law, and the selection of officials. As will come to be seen, these parameters can probably be measured in any polity around the world with results illuminating a specific nature of democracy that underlies entire democratic governance structures which are currently present. This form of analysis can be reproduced and has strong objective capacities which allows for democracy to be observed as an ever changing constant, like a house that sports different colours as time goes by. The structure (democracy) is the same, but the colours (understandings of the parameters equality, communication, law, and the selection of officials) change over time as the plurality of the citizenry and its issues changes. The importance of this is that it can produce statistics which indicate how governing institutions should be styled, what policies are most relevant, and ultimately what needs to be done to complete the pluralist objectives of the citizenry for progress and the advancement of the human condition. It is unfortunate, but most of these things are not effectively happening (some are not happening at all) under current understandings and practices of democracy which is one reason why we are experiencing a backlash against democracy: those fighting for it, and against it, simply do not understand what it is. Hopefully this article will change that.

Moving forward, a point that Keane (2009) missed when proving that Athens was not the cradle of democracy is that it shows the focus Sartori, Dahl (or earlier with Mill and Paine) took on direct democracy being some form of an ideal is misguided. This focus on direct democracy and arguing its applicability over the last few centuries led to the push for representation and voting mechanisms which are so commonly mistaken for democracy today. Methods of representation are institutions which were, in most part, developed to create a likening of 'directness' in countries with large populations and geographic space. But with Athens now being seen as not the creator of democracy, but another ancient polity which practiced a style of it, it is clear that works to date have been arguing over styles of democracy and not democracy itself. This is a point that is evident in Sartori (1987) as he notes that academics (and imaginably regular people alike) lump together so many concepts when using the term democracy. He then does not direct his work at defining democracy but rather talks about how Liberal democracy is the best model for Western polities to adopt. A difficulty Sartori neglected to address is that Liberal democracy is still a contentious term as the style does not apply everywhere in the 'West', especially in this ever growing multicultural and cosmopolitan world.

Contrasting with the criticism of Sartori's work which lacked a clear attempt at defining democracy, is Dworkin (2008) who in turn makes that very attempt:

The two views of democracy that are in contest are these. According to the *majoritarian* view, democracy is government by majority will, that is, in accordance with the will of the greatest number of people, expressed in elections with universal or near universal suffrage. There is no guarantee that a majority will decide fairly; its decisions may be unfair to minorities whose interests the majority systematically ignores. If so, then the democracy is unjust but no less democratic for that reason. According to the rival *partnership* view of democracy, however, democracy means that the people govern themselves each as a full partner in a collective political enterprise so that a majority's decisions are democratic only when certain further conditions are met that protect the status and interests of each citizen as a full partner in that enterprise. (Dworkin, 2008:131)

As can be seen, Dworkin (2008) defines democracy by dividing it based on *views* and not harder evidence. Furthermore, Dworkin (2008) is not defining democracy but detailing two popular differences concerning the nature of the pluralist citizenry's *sovereignty*. Once a pluralist citizenry has established (either implicitly or explicitly) the nature of their sovereignty, they may then express it via their own interpretations of equality, communication, law, and the selection of officials. After that point, the adoption, modification, or creation of institutions occurs and a culturally relevant style of democracy emerges.ⁱ That is democracy because it applies, as will come to be seen, everywhere presently and historically which is something no other definition has achieved. Continuing, the Element of Democracy Theory is the only definition that withstands scrutiny as it is not based on skewed theory or misdirected empirical analyses (as empirical studies were initially modeled on said skewed theory). However, this work does not concern describing in-depth the Element of Democracy theory but rather showing that it may be true by demonstrating it meets the same parameters for theoretical acceptance as did Special Relativity.

The importance of this is twofold: firstly, it could solidify the validity of a universal theory and definition of democracy by establishing that it meets non-ideological parameters, that it is useful (and hence true from a Nietzschean perspective), and that it can be applied in political science because democracy can be observed in objective space. Secondly, this paper establishes a methodology through which other theories in social science can be tested. Do they meet the same parameters as accepted theories in physics? Are there testable applications? And finally, are they useful? This method of testing social theories could be the answer that Miller (1987) was seeking, see below:

Whereas the classical political theorists were unavoidably amateur political scientists – gathering information by casual observation and hearsay in a fairly haphazard way – their would-be successors are liable to be overwhelmed by systematically gathered data...[in reference to later political theorists] Their work is philosophically sophisticated but poorly-grounded empirically, and highly vulnerable to criticism by social scientists. Further progress in the field must involve rectifying this imbalance, a task that is, however, easier to set than to achieve. (Miller, 1987:385)

The Element of Democracy Theory, in Brief

Currently, there are several units of work that have been produced concerning this theory which will be summarized for the reader before continuing. There will also be a small discussion relating why defining an objective democracy, and not a style, is important as well as how it can be useful to political science. Previously, there was mention of archaeological and anthropological evidence somehow pertaining to democracy. In 'The Anthropologic History of Democracy' it is shown that Jared Diamond (1997, 2005) and John Keane (2009) synthesized allowed this genealogy of democracy to emerge. The result is called the 'archaeo-anthropologic argument' in that Mesolithic and Neolithic human societies practiced objective democracy. They had their own understandings of the societal unit (hence citizenry), their own power structures (sovereignty), their own practice of equality, norms (hence laws), selecting officials, as well as communication. Diamond (1997, 2005) discussed current hunter-gatherer societies with past ones making mention of all the Element of Democracy Theory's parameters, whilst Keane (2009) showed democracy not to have been invented by Athenians, but something that was practiced by the Mycenaeans a full 1500 years before Athens. As concepts of democracy were present in our oldest form of recorded writing (as in a Mycenaean style of it), and that hunter-gatherer societies coupled with discussions of archaeological evidence made use of the theory's parameters, this notion of a 46,000 year old democracy came about. Ultimately, it resulted in the argument that democracy is organic to human social organization as is the obverse totalitarian or elitist rule which can also be seen throughout human history.

The 'democracy paradox' details how the theory originally came forward. It was the result of a grounded theory analysis (see Charmaz, 2006) of thirty distinct styles of democracy. These types of democratic practice are each rooted in previous publications from present polities, to historical ones, to theoretical ones. The research question simply asked: "what are the most fundamental commonalities between each style?" with the result producing the eventual parameters of equality, communication, the selection of officials, and law. From there, it was necessary to engage how the citizenry and how sovereignty were perceived in the thirty styles and ultimately how they could fit the parameters produced. The most interesting result of the work was that it completely stripped away current dependencies on institutions, economic status, infrastructural maturity, and so forth that are at present considered necessary for democracy to happen. The evidence argues to the obverse of that, suggesting that democracy is already present (and has been for a very long time) regardless of development or Western concepts of democratic practice.

It is prudent here to explain the way sovereignty is conceptualised. It has nothing to do with the state, nation, majority, or culture. Sovereignty has everything to do with that simple democratic truth that power resides within the pluralist citizenry. The nation-state (should that still exist), majority, and culture derive its power from the individuals which compose it. This form of sovereignty validates the existence of these bodies because they are needed to maintain the structures of a citizenry's social organization. Without them it is surmisable that a variety of ills would ensue. However, these constructs do not have sovereignty over its citizenry which is a familiar concept present in the 'rule of law'. Furthermore, the reason 'rule of' was removed in the 'law' parameter of the definition is due to Keane's (2009) insightful remark that nothing rules in a democracy.

As will be seen, the concepts necessary to viewing democracy differently than it is at present were possible thanks to Kofi Annan, the UNDP, and John Keane's previous works. Annan pressed forward the point that democracy must be culturally relevant for it to work (this is operating from the perspective that non-Western countries do not have democracy which is not the case); The UNDP currently focuses on dialogue and non-violence for democracy to succeed; and Keane (specifically 2004) demonstrated that violence is the anti-thesis to democracy as it destroys dialogue, civil society, and equality. From there it was possible to engage the research in such a way as to try and see if there is something more or different to our current understandings of democracy. The biggest lead was that there currently is no universally accepted definition of democracy and that the concept is misunderstood with the term misused on a daily basis: that was the driving force that resulted in the Element of Democracy Theory.

The importance of having an objective, universally applicable, measurable, and basic definition of democracy can be seen in several ways. Firstly, it produces a basic level of understanding which people can use to correctly view democracy. As such, instead of using the term 'democracy' when discussing for example the policies of Canada, the user would state 'our understanding of democracy' or 'Canadian democracy' as this would deliver greater precision in the discussion with less room for vagaries. This point was argued in an unpublished work which showed that a selection of twenty-five out of thirty articles published by the journal *Political Analysis* misused the term 'democracy' in their works which in weakened their arguments to varying degrees. Secondly, an objective democracy removes the current negative baggage the concept has. "Democracy doesn't work, democracy is evil, democracy only works in the West, you need x, y, and z and to spend this much money for democracy to work" and so on are common in today's vernacular with the frustrating aspect being that the aforementioned is not necessarily true. By removing negative connotations and empowering people with the ability to analyze democracy at various levels of government, it promotes an environment of progress – one that can lead to the growth of democracy and not a struggle against the application of a style of it popularly believed to be the best form of democracy (e.g. Liberal American). Thirdly, it produces a reference point that can be used to better understand styles of democracy. For example, how does Liberal American, Swedish, and Argentinean democracy affect equality, communication, law, and the selection of officials? Is the citizenry considered a plurality, and what is the nature of their sovereignty? Questions such as these and focuses on institutions can be used to gauge how effective certain styles democracy or their policies are on democracy itself which is something we do not currently have the capacity to do.

As such, the theory may prove to be a useful tool for political science as it describes and explains democracy in a way that has been sought for some time now. As will come to be seen, after the parameters of the theory have been defined by the data procured from the citizenry in question, a sartorial measurement index of the democratic style in question can be made. This would then potentially permit a polity to measure the effects of certain actions, such as a new policy mitigating an aspect of corruption, on democracy which in my humble opinion, is a certain type of awesome.

A Methodology for Universal Truth

The aspects of the 'universal truth' methodology used herein include testing the Element of Democracy for 'beauty' and 'truth'. Beauty details the notions of harmony, unification, and simplicity which are guides used in theoretical physics to gauge the worthiness or 'fit' of a new theory. Truth simply equates to utility in this context. It is useful at this juncture to further explain this notion in physics why may be alien to social scientists and political theorists alike.

Longair (1984) describes the situation best through Dirac (1962):

Previously, I interested only in exact equations. It seemed to me that if one worked with approximations there was an intolerable ugliness in one's work and I very much wanted to preserve mathematical beauty. Well, the engineering training which I received did teach me to tolerate approximations and I was able to see that even theories based on approximations could have a considerable amount of beauty in them. (Dirac, 1962, in Longair, 1984:7)

Longairⁱⁱ (1984:7-8) continues to discuss that this notion of beauty is an important sentiment. "Note that Dirac was describing theoretical physics at its very highest level – concepts like Newton's laws of motion, special and general relativity, Schrödinger's equation and the Dirac equation are the *very summits of achievement of theoretical physics...*" He continues to share that "the same sentiments [of beauty in approximation] apply, however, in their various ways to all aspects of research as soon as we attempt to model quantitatively the natural world." Zakrzewski (2008) furthers, when discussing Zee's (2007) work, that Zee employs real life examples so as to make his writing more accessible to the non-physicist reader. Zakrzewski goes as far as to point out that comparisons between art, music, and even ice cream can be made with theories in physics. The same is probably applicable for social science, especially as the theory of democracy discussed herein is considered an observation of objects in space or universal foundations in human organization rather than an individual ideology.

In a talk at a conference, Nobel winner Murray Gell-Man (2007) stated that "what is especially striking and remarkable is that in fundamental physics a beautiful or elegant theory is more likely to be right than a theory that is inelegant" (Gell-Man, 2007). He continued to share that

In 1957 some of us put forward a partially complete theory of weak force, in disagreement with the results of seven experiments. It was beautiful and so we dared to publish it, believing that all those experiments must be wrong. In fact, they were all wrong. (Gell-Mann, 2007)

The Element of Democracy theory may do the same in political science. There are a great many attempts from previous and current thinkers made trying to understand, peg, and ultimately measure what democracy is – however all of them were unsuccessful to date because they are unfortunately inelegant. To reiterate from before, it is a fact that people have only been defining styles of democracy (subjective democracy) rather than searching out to theorize democracy itself (objective democracy). That statement is not entirely fair to certain scholars such as Keane (2009, 2004, 2003, 2003, 1991) as well as dignitaries like Kofi Annan or the work of the UNDP as these actors were the major ones to push away from stylized democracy and focus on objective democracy (albeit in an implicit manner). As was seen, Keane wrote extensively on violence, civil society, the internet, and the history of democracy; Annan spoke of the necessity for democracy to be something that rose from the bottom-up, something

that ultimately needed to be culturally applicable; and the UNDP currently focuses on dialogue and non-violence as the key requisites for democracy to succeed. It is a focus on objects in social organization rather than subjective ideologies and how they impact objects. The Element of Democracy Theory would not have been able to come about without these initial steps in that objective direction.

Gell-Man (2007) shares that “a theory appears to be beautiful or elegant (or simple, if you prefer) when it can be expressed concisely in terms of mathematics [or understanding] we currently have.” Short of going into the formal theory of democracy (which would only depict in numbers the beauty of the theory) there is already perhaps a tremendous elegance and simplicity to the definition. Firstly, the theory is culturally relevant meaning that it can be observedⁱⁱⁱ in every country of the world; secondly, democracy is present in every polity level of the world (municipal, local-regional, state-provincial, national-federal, and international); thirdly, evidence shows that democracy may have been practiced for at least the past 46,000 years; and finally that it is currently the only theory of democracy that is universal and objective.

The simplicity of the theory is as follows. Democracy is the pluralist citizenry expressing its sovereignty (whatever the citizenry defines sovereignty as) through their own human and cultural practices of equality, law, the selection of officials, and communication. Absolutely anything beyond that is a stylization of democracy, not democracy itself. The grounded theory analysis that ultimately led to the theory was done because it was seen that no other thinker had conducted this form of analysis before. For example, Dahl, Lijphart, Dworkin, and Rawls were drawing from that tricky nexus Miller (1987) mentioned of observation mixed with empirical evidence. The observation did not have a platform to operate on (how does one observe democracy when democracy itself is not defined) and that the empirical evidence being drawn from is based on experiments that have operated on these skewed theories of democracy. These thinkers were noticing the importance of equality, law, the selection of officials (by way of voting), and communication, but they did not manage to put them together and to see how they unified with the pluralist citizenry and sovereignty. They also were not at the stage of recognizing democracy as something that needed to be culturally subjective (in that the objective parameters must be defined by the citizenry) especially in the face of Huntington’s clash of civilizations and the incorrect understanding that democracy was invented by the Greeks and hence a Western affair.

Chandrasekhar (1990) stated that “beauty is that to which the human mind responds at its deepest and most profound.” Furthermore, Bussey (2009) argues that universality applies to beauty in physics, that the theory applies everywhere in the physical world and that nature itself defines the objectivity of the observation. It would be difficult to ascertain if the minds of readers would be responding in ‘deep and profound ways’ which is why that will be left to the reader to decide. However, the point on universality can be seen under the next sub-heading providing discussion on several examples of how democracy can be observed at any, and potentially all, forms of political organization.

Gell-Man (2007) continues to share that “Nature obeys laws and, in Newton’s words ‘It is the business of natural philosophy to find them out’...The laws are not just some construct of the human mind, although human beings are engaged in an effort to find successive approximations to those laws

and finally, perhaps, discover their exact form.” This corresponds with Bussey’s (2009) statement that “we do not invent these things – it seems that we uncover them. They are hidden harmonies.” The same argument can be made in relation to the Element of Democracy Theory. It is not a construct of my mind for it is observable, by any observer, in action everywhere human polities are operating. A first attempt in a currently unpublished work resulted in the development of the methodologies which can be used either in a quantitative or qualitative framework. The method used in the paper was to qualitatively analyse Australian media, national and international law concerning equality, communication, law, and the selection of officials. This analysis resulted in an implicit understanding of the state of democracy in Australia by identifying the problems surrounding the four parameters. In other words, it was an observation of the issues Australians were concerned about in regards to the four parameters which painted an approximation of democracy in Australia. This methodology can be used at the state level, local-regional, or municipal level. There is the more precise methodology of surveying the citizens of Australia and asking them hyper-specific questions relating to the four parameters which would produce exact quantitative results. That technique, however, is expensive but could be done in conjunction with a national census as unrealistic as that may sound. It is reasoned that appropriate population sampling would be equally appropriate which, despite my dislike of sampling populations in preference for long-term, costly, but ultimately better statistics, is a recommended avenue for the reader to take when conducting an explicit analysis of, for example, democracy in Perth.

Leibowitz’s (2008) work compares the shared effects of beauty in physics and art. He argues that both have the same effect on the mind of the observer (recalling Chandrasekhar). Why do fine art and ice cream warrant comparison with physics with social science considered too ideological? If Leibowitz can show that the aesthetics and esoteric nature of art is comparable to the same concepts in physics, then social science can gain the same repute. The Element of Democracy is only one example used in this work, but the writings of Simmel, Weber, Marx, and other early theorists can similarly have their ideas put to the same test as currently they are enjoying a resurrection due to the fact that their observations still relate to modern society.

Moving forward, Gell-Man (2007) states that assumption in certain areas of physics are quantum-mechanical and thus “predicts probabilities (some of which can be near certainties) for future events, given past ones.” This is another example of how the Element of Democracy may shine. The archaeo-anthropologic argument used, as was explained, describes the past events and genealogical evidence of democracy. The mechanics of democracy can be observed in ancient polities as well. A picture of democracy in Athens or Rome can be displayed firstly by analyzing the nature of sovereignty and the composition of the citizenry. From that point the pluralist citizenry’s definition of equality, law, communication, and the selection of officials can be stipulated ultimately resulting in an understanding of the state of democracy. From that point, institutions and other practices are better understood as they are created on that picture of democracy.^{iv}

Johnson (2008) brings about an interesting argument that beauty can be present in experiments, with Bussey (2009) relating this better than I could have hoped to: “A beautiful experiment must be planned. Its execution must be both a physical and an intellectual exercise, combined. Matter and form are being united in a temporal way now, and here one might find potential analogies to music,

to dance and to drama.” In discussing ballet, Bussey describes that there are forms which must be followed but the result, for example the slaying of the villain, may not be a foregone conclusion which is the same with physical experiments he states. When engaging the Element of Democracy Theory, the forms of the analysis are present, but the mystery of the outcome remains: what will the style of Berlin’s local democracy be? Or what do the people of South Dakota or Ontario consider equality to be? And although it was not a goal of this work to create a ‘political science of ballet’ analogy, it seems to work in the theory of democracy context.

Continuing, Gell-Man (2007) also states that as new theories are created, or as science achieves the recognition of a smaller particle, the theory resembles the one before it which is also the case with democracy. The Element of Democracy Theory did not emerge out of a vacuum but was simply the unification of previous, fragmented, work done on the matter through a unique perspective. It was taking the Nietzschean approach to truth in that the definition of democracy must be useful; it was taking the Simmelian path to recognizing the objective by comparing the subjective through a grounded theory analysis; it was applying the endemic governance problems historical analysis viewpoint to democracy’s history and observing democracy from a Rosanvallon (2007),^v Girling (1997),^{vi} and Adamsian technique (O’Neil, 2007);^{vii} it was tracking democracy’s genealogy through an archaeo-anthropological argument; it was recognizing the works of other thinkers, professionals, and organizations that thought and worked with democracy; and it was ultimately the formation of a potential unified theory of democracy. Although, in hindsight, this all seems deliberately planned, it was rather fumbled upon.

Here, Gell-Man (2007) discusses symmetry:

We must now refer to the idea of symmetry. A circle, for example, is symmetrical under all rotations about the centre of the circle. In three dimensions, a sphere is likewise symmetrical under all rotations about its centre. An object or a phenomenon exhibits a kind of symmetry if performing certain operations consistently on all parts leaves its description unchanged. We say the object or phenomenon is symmetrical under those operations. (Gell-Man, 2007)

Take the phenomenon of the Element of Democracy Theory and consider its symmetry. It can be observed in Capetown, Washington, Beijing, and Manila; it can be observed in present-day hunter-gatherer societies or from Mesolithic or Neolithic people based on behaviours inferred from archaeological evidence; it can be observed in Quebec, Texas, Bavaria, or Western Australia; it can be observed in Samoa, Sri Lanka, Somalia, and Peru; and it can be observed in the EU, the UN, NATO,^{viii} ASEAN, and NAFTA. In other words, the phenomenon can be rotated in various applications but its theoretical description remains unchanged. The sphere rotates just as democracy does; it is a construct apparent in human polities which can be observed even in countries that are considered non-democratic. The only way personally imaginable that the Element of Democracy Theory can be compromised is if humans are completely destroyed as democracy may be endemic to human nature, it could be an organic form of social organization.

Now comes the aspect of utility. If we were to attempt the application of a certain style of democracy in a universal aspect, say for the sake of argument liberal American (whatever that might actually be) such would not work as many of the institutions built atop democracy in America would be culturally alien or inappropriately engineered for the different cultures of the world. Barring Iraq, Afghanistan, the Global Financial Crisis, etc, from the example, it is directly possible to see that it would not be useful to try and install American democracy in a different country because it would be the stylizing of one plurality's democracy over the style of another plurality's democracy rather than trying to assist the other country in promoting its own style of democracy. The modern argument that a certain level of economics, development, or institutions are necessary for democracy to happen in a country is most likely rubbish. The only matters that economics, etc., relate to are once more the stylizations of democracy and not democracy itself. That is why the Element of Democracy Theory useful and hence true as it assists even in defining styles of democracy. It is not dependent on institutions, it is not necessary to have high speed internet, parliaments, or a certain capital index (although these things can be useful if a culture appropriates them) for democracy is arguably a constant. It is probably already in the Niger delta, and was most likely in Iraq 40,000 years before the Bush administration invaded and may have also present in Iraq under Saddam Hussein albeit in a suppressed form.

It is at this stage that we can begin to appreciate democracy as a property and not an ideology. As Gell-Man (2007) stated, gravity and the movement of the planets is not the design of a single mind but something that everyone knows. It is certainly something that can be appreciated by the human mind, but is not localized to one individual ideological truth. In other words, democracy is most likely a realistic function found in all human polities just as gravity forms its own rules about the natural environment. They are both observable everywhere they apply, and it is, once more to extend from Gell-Man (2007) a good probability that life on other planets will come to have this form of governance present as well. There are but a finite amount of ways that social organization can occur. Totalitarian brutality is one extreme, and a functioning super-enhanced democracy the other. Social organizations have the capacity for each, for as democracy is present at all times so is the threat of totalitarian rule which cannot erase democracy but suppress it until it manages to rise again.

Concerning Objectivity

To demonstrate the objectivity of the Element of Democracy, the same method of identifying democracy will be used in six examples. The first concerns the municipal; the second local/regional; the third state/provincial; the fourth federal/national; the fifth international; and the sixth a non-traditional governmental body. In the effort of mitigating selection bias, the specific regions will be chosen by a random lottery. The random generator^{ix} produces a list of geographic names which include cities, regions, and countries, with the list producing random names with every click of the refresh button. The tenth item appearing on the list will then be the selected region. Should the tenth item be, for instance, a municipality the second time around, the next region up the list will be chosen, with this process continuing until each example has a randomly generated region for analysis. The fifth example will simply take the country that appears in the tenth spot and analyse one of the major international bodies

it is a member of. The exception to this is the sixth example which will target NATO and the Naga indigenous community of India as non-traditional polity examples wherein democracy can be observed.

Once a place has been chosen, the location is verified on Google Maps. In order, Nagoya, Japan will be the municipality; the island of Lemnos in Greece will serve as a local region; Sardinia will represent the state or provincial level as it is an island currently part of Italy; Moldova will act as the country; and the Council of Europe will be the international level as Moldova is a member. If this list were not randomly generated, there would have been a greater attempt at involving Africa, South America, and the South Pacific, but as will come to be seen this methodology can most likely be used by the reader in those areas to identify their style or state of democracy.

To analyse Nagoya, it is first essential to understand the nature of its pluralist citizenry. By mining government census data, a picture of the population is generated and the plurality is better understood. However, despite groups being acknowledged on census data, it is argued that individuals within a distinct group are also varied which then begs the necessity at understanding individuals in Nagoya perhaps by looking at other trends such as consumer habits, voting behaviour, and other non-census based statistics.

After which, it is necessary to understand how they identify their sovereignty. What is the nature of power in Nagoyan society? As it is a governmental system that practices voting, and a one-person one-vote schematic, sovereignty is partly defined by that measure. However, there are the other issues of lobbying and using capitalism to influence government for the benefit of the few over the many. However, in the main, sovereignty is expressed mainly through voting.

Following that, the way Nagoyans define or understand equality, law, communication, and the selection of officials must be looked at. The entirety of these affairs can be conducted in an implicit or explicit manner, however, both of the methods are recommended. Implicitly, local media and regulations can be looked at to create an approximation (via quantitative or qualitative analysis) of issues surrounding these four parameters. Explicitly, carefully crafted sample populations can be surveyed to gain a more specific understanding of what Nagoyans understand when discussing the parameters. Once the data has been analysed (which in itself can be contentious for a variety of error related reasons), the implicit and explicit results can be comparatively scrutinized for results.

It is after this point that Nagoyan democracy can be measured. Their democracy can be used to view how they have been implicitly organising their society through, for example, institutions and regulations to develop a Nagoyan style of democracy. Furthermore, their democracy can be used to create a scale (as relevant indicators are now available) to monitor how democracy is affected by certain changes in the future. This study of Nagoyan democracy can also paint the picture of the present state of democracy in that particular municipality perhaps allowing the observer to create a visual model showing that perhaps communication is strong due to technology but equality is suppressed as there are a variety of issues with it or conflicting understandings of it in the community. Hence, democracy (this objective body of parameters) allows the observer to understand the style of democracy Nagoyans are practicing which may ultimately help them enhance it should that be their desire.

Although Lemnos is larger geographically than Nagoya (477 square km to 326 square km), its population is considerably smaller (Nagoya roughly 2.2 million: Lemnos, approximately 18,000) however the same methodological principles apply. One needs to identify the plurality of the citizenry on the island; then secure an understanding of their sovereignty; at which point the implicit and explicit analysis of the four parameters can be made; and the understanding of Lemnos's democratic style can be had. From there forward, the development of a relevant index of democratic health for the region can be created, and democracy can also be measured against prominent governance ills such as corruption or issues of accountability to gauge whether mitigating accountability issues, for example, will noticeably improve one or more parameters.

Going slightly west from Lemnos, the Italian province of Sardinia is found. The same principles apply here. What is the nature of the Sardinian plurality, and how do they define their sovereignty? What are their understandings of equality, communication, law, and the selection of officials? It is at this stage that the degree of information can become appreciated. Should this study of democracy be conducted on all municipalities and regions in Sardinia then perhaps an in-depth understanding of democracy could be had rather than attempting to reproduce a large scale approximation of Sardinia's democratic style. The same applies for Moldova, slightly north-east of Sardinia. Identify its plural citizenry; gain an understanding of what the plurality considers its sovereignty to be, and then measure the parameters to once more create a Moldovan picture of democracy over which indices can be made, institutions potentially improved, and perhaps enhance democracy itself. These possibilities are allowed because Moldovans will be the source of democracy and not the recipients of a style of government that attempts to be democratic. It is, by my limited capacities, evident to state that all citizens are the recipients of democracy and only engage in democracy implicitly: they may not know they already have democracy with them nor that they are constantly changing the way the parameters are defined.

Moving to the Council of Europe of which Moldova is a member state, the methodology is the same. What is the plurality of the members of the Council? In this case there are forty seven member states which represent the citizenry (both in the model and in real life). Their sovereignty is ascertained by the rights they have in the council, in this case the Committee of Ministers, who are the decision making body that gives each representative a vote. In democratically styled polities, voting is the most common tool of sovereignty which enables the conceptual aspects of sovereignty to be acted upon. At this stage, the council members, or citizens, can be explicitly surveyed concerning their understandings of the four parameters which then complete the picture of democracy within the Council of Europe. Furthermore, this same methodology can be used for NATO (identify plurality, identify sovereignty, identify parameters).

Finally, taking the last non-traditional polity form is the Naga indigenous people found in India. Measuring their democracy can be done using, once more, the same methodology. What is the Naga plurality? What is the nature of their sovereignty? What are their understandings of the four parameters? In this case, however, results will be different as the Naga are a state (Nagaland) at times violently opposed to Indian rule. As such, it is predicted that Naga democracy will be suppressed in certain areas and that the nature of their sovereignty will be different than the other regions analysed (perhaps the Naga feel they have no sovereignty in the voting sense but rather in the human rights or

indigenous sense). It is interesting to suggest that this analysis may serve as a way to identify the sovereign strengths of indigenous or minority peoples with the parameters taking shape not based on votes but perhaps on United Nations special interest pressure. The parameters would then potentially create new pathways for these non-traditional sovereign powers to be strengthened.

As has just been seen, it is possible to apply the Element of Democracy theory to any traditional or non-traditional polity which, perhaps, exemplifies its objective capacity. It is felt that should any observer use the methodology in any geographical region at the same time, such would result in the same or similar outcome depending on the margin of error during research or analysis.

Conclusion

It is at this stage prudent to discuss Einstein's Special Relativity in conjunction with what has just been learned about the Element of Democracy Theory. Special Relativity concerned in most part the simplification of Maxwell's equations. The Element of Democracy is comparatively the simplification of previous attempts at 'solving' democracy. It explains where and why other thinkers have gone wrong, and provides a much simpler way of viewing and understanding this method of social organization. Like the work that Relativity enabled in the future, the Element of Democracy may permit the realization that democracy is over 46,000 years old; that it is an objective property found in all polities; that it can never be erased without erasing all humans; that it is universally applicable; and that essentially most of what has been written about democracy is unfortunately incorrect and needs rethinking – especially concerning the way the term democracy has been used over the years and the way it is conceptualized in the current global discourse. Although this work has not been present for long, it is still evident that no one knows exactly what democracy is, and it is still used incorrectly everyday which is a situation that truly needs to change.

Einstein's Special Relativity had beauty. It was useful for describing certain aspects of the universe, it was simple and elegant, it had perfect symmetry, and it did not come out of a vacuum (meaning that it could be seen where Einstein's work came from). As was seen, the Element of Democracy Theory met these criteria. It has elegance, simplicity, symmetry, history, universality, and is all the more beautiful because it can be observed by anyone. It is a property of social organization just as gravity is a natural law.

The importance of this argument is that it shows political theories can, like theories in physics, or bodies of art, have universal applications and can also be put to the same standardized tests for truth. The example used was the Element of Democracy Theory which, as was shown, has most likely defined democracy as a property or objective element found in social organization wherever human polities existed or currently exist. This was seen firstly by discussing why a universal definition of democracy has not yet been achieved; secondly by explaining the Element theory; thirdly, by showing what the parameters of beauty and truth are in physics and how the Element of Democracy meets those criteria; and fourthly by briefly showing that this new definition of democracy stands as true as Special Relativity did^x since Einstein's theory met the same criteria.

Works Cited

Barber, B. R. 2003. Which Democracy and Which Technology? In: *Democracy and New Media*, H. Jenkins and D. Thorburn (eds). Cambridge: Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press.

Barber, B. R. 2003a. *Fears Empire: War, Terrorism, and Democracy*. New York: W.W. Norton and Co.

Barber, B. R. 1984. *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age*. California: University of California Press.

Bussey, P. J. 2009. Beauty and Physics. *Contemporary Physics*. 50(3): 479-482.

Chandrasekhar, S. 1990. *Truth and Beauty: Aesthetics and Motivations in Science*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Charmaz, C. 2006. *Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide Through Qualitative Analysis*. London: SAGE.

Dahl, R. A. 1985. *A Preface to Economic Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Dahl, R. A. 1989. *Democracy and Its Critics*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dahl, R. A. 1997. *Toward Democracy - A Journey: Reflections, 1940-1997*. Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies Press, University of California, Berkeley.

Diamond, J. 1997. *Guns, Germs, and Steel*. Great Britain: Chatto and Windus.

Diamond, J. 2005. *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Survive*. Toronto: Penguin Books.

Dirac, P. A. M. 1962. Interview with P. A. M. Dirac. By Thomas S. Kuhn and Eugene Paul Wigner. Princeton: New Jersey.

Dworkin, R. 2008. *Is Democracy Possible Here? : Principles for a New Political Debate*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Franco, P. 1990. *The Political Philosophy of Michael Oakeshott*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Fukuyama, F. 1989. The End of History? in *The National Interest*. G. O Tuathail, S. Dalby, and P. Routledge eds. *The Geopolitics Reader*. New York: National Affairs.

Gell-Man, M. 2007. Murray Gell-Man on Beauty and Truth in Physics. In: Ted2007 Conference, online source (video, http://www.ted.com/talks/murray_gell_mann_on_beauty_and_truth_in_physics.html) accessed 14/05/2010.

Girling, J. L. S. 1997. *Corruption, Capitalism, and Democracy*. London: Routledge.

Henneaux, M., and J. Zanelli. eds. 2009. *Quantum Mechanics of Fundamental Systems: The Quest for Beauty and Simplicity*. New York: Springer.

Holub, R. C. 1991. *Jurgen Habermas: Critic in the Public Sphere*. London.

Johnson, G. 2008. *The Ten Most Beautiful Experiments*. London: The Bodley Head.

Keane, J. 2009. *The Life and Death of Democracy*. London: Simon and Schuster.

Keane, J. 2004. *Violence and Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Keane, J. 2003. *Global Civil Society?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Keane, J. 2002. *Whatever Happened to Democracy?* London: Institute for Public Policy Research.

Keane, J. 1991. *The Media and Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Leibowitz, J. R. 2008. *Hidden Harmony. The Connected Worlds of Physics and Art*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lijphart, A. 1994. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lijphart, A. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in 36 Countries*. London: Yale University Press.

Longair, M. S. 1984. *Theoretical Concepts in Physics: An Alternative View of Theoretical Reasoning in Physics for Final Year Undergraduates*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McCarthy, T. A. 1984. *The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas*. Cambridge: Polity.

Miller, D., ed. 1987. *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought*. New York: B. Blackwell.

O'Neil, D. L. July 2007. John Adams Versus Mary Wollstonecraft on the French Revolution and Democracy. *Journal of the History of Ideas*. Vol. 68, Iss. 3: 451.

Pogge, T. W. M. 2007. *John Rawls: His Life and Theory of Justice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rosanvallon, P. Oct 2007. Intellectual History and Democracy: An Interview with Pierre Rosanvallon. *Journal of the History of Ideas*. Vol. 68, Iss. 4: 703.

Sartori, G. 1973. *Democrazia e Definizione*. Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Press.

Sartori, G. 1987. *The Theory of Democracy Revisited*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers.

White, S. K. (ed). 1995. *The Cambridge Companion to Habermas*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Zakrzewski, W. J. 2008. Fearful Symmetry: The Search for Beauty in Modern Physics. *Journal of Physics and Mathematical Theory*. 41.

Zee, A. 2007. *Fearful Symmetry: The Search for Beauty in Modern Physics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Notes

ⁱ Culture can be viewed to be figmentive and that it is nothing but the sum of individuals interacting via identifiable social parameters which creates an ever shifting generalization called culture. Culture is viewed as the unique result of many individuals interacting with each other and not a generalized stereotype partially due to how it fits my arguments concerning the pluralist citizenry (in that there is no such thing as the majority unless certain processes are followed).

ⁱⁱ Other examples and explanations of 'beauty' in physics can be seen by investigating Henneaux and Zanelli (2009) as well as Zee (2007).

ⁱⁱⁱ This is a particularly important point. Democracy is, as was discussed, potentially everywhere and may have been for over 46,000 years. It is not something that is to be imposed; it is not something that was developed by the Mycenaeans 1500 years before a great deal of other polities in the Mediterranean had a go at it (see Keane, 2009). Democracy is potentially something that simply needs to be cultivated, and to be realized that there is no need to build it for it is already there. Once a people recognize this, then culturally relevant methods of enhancing democracy can take shape and a particular (as well as appropriate) style of democracy emerges *from democracy itself*.

^{iv} It should be noted that endemic governance problems are also responsible for the creation of institutions as polities seek to mitigate them. Endemic governance problems are a set of 7 issues observed to have been plaguing polities for at least the last 3500 years (these problems still persist). They are:

- 1) Accountability
- 2) Corruption
- 3) Transparency
- 4) Representation
- 5) Campaigning Methods
- 6) Constitutional Issues
- 7) Lack of Long-Term Goals

The problems are intrinsically linked to democracy and it was argued in an unpublished work that if they are mitigated then democracy is enhanced.

^v Rosanvallon stated that it was necessary for the history of a subject to be known before being able to comment on it.

^{vi} Girling (1997:152) stated that history can be used “to provide the organizing principle. In this sense: historical investigation over a sufficient lengthy period of time – from decades to a century or more – reveals, in the first place, dominant patterns of activity...” which summarily can be said to “let history do the talking.”

^{vii} “Adams turned to history, understood as a repository of empirical evidence, examples, and data pertaining to the success or failure of particular institutional experiments in governing human beings over time” (O’Neil, 2007:¶18). Adams thought that scrutinizing history “could reveal the motive force, the crucial independent variable, if you will, driving it.” O’Neil, 2007:¶18). The question Adams’ perspective brought about throughout the thesis is whether endemic problems are a ‘motive force’ for enhancing democracy and improved governance.

^{viii} Taking NATO as an example, the methodology for observing democracy is still most likely sound and uncompromised. Which individuals comprise the ‘citizenry’ of NATO (all those people involved in the treaty)? What is the nature of their sovereignty (as in what powers do they have)? How do they select officials? What are their laws? What is the nature of their communication? What is their understanding of equality? By answering these questions democracy in NATO comes apparent. This technique can be extended to business and other social constructs. Some may show democracy is suppressed or skewed and appear to be more autocratic (like some political parties or political regimes) whilst others may have all parameters active and styled a certain way.

^{ix} A not entirely impressive website generates a new list of city, region, and country names. Visit <http://unique-names.com/geographic-name.php> to see.

^x Einstein’s Special Relativity is currently being challenged as truth (utility) in physics continues to grow. Should anyone find the comparison between the Element of Democracy Theory weakened by this circumstance, Newton and his work on gravity can be substituted for Einstein. This also brings about an interesting point: if Einstein’s work was once true (should it be refuted in the future) is the same predictable for the Element of Democracy Theory? The answer, in my opinion, is should social organization advance to such a degree as to be alien from what has been known since before the Mesolithic period, then maybe democracy has an expiry date. But until such a time, democracy (certainly not a specific style of it as Fukuyama, 1989, argued) is probably going to stay as true as gravity.